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Would rational individuals co-operate, even if
wholly self-interested? In the event of their not
doing so, might there still be reason why they
should? And in that case, would the enforcement
of co-operation be justified; would it be something
which the individuals ought to welcome? The pre-
dicament projected in such questions has been at
or near the focus of social theory since at least the
time of Hobbes. But recently it has become particu-
larly salient. It has found a perspicuous and per-
suasive exemplification in the prisoner's dilemma.
The prisoner's dilemma gets its name from the
following story. A district attorney confronts two
prisoners who are held for a crime which she
believes they jointly committed. Knowing that she
lacks evidence to pin the crime on them in court
she devises a predicament which ensures that they
both confess.
She interviews each on his own and offers a deal.
Confess and you go free if the other chap refuses
whereas you get a three-quarters rap if he also
confesses. Refuse to confess and you get a quarter
rap — on some trumped-up charge or whatever —
if the other prisoner also refuses while you get the
full term if he confesses. The D.A. tells each that
she is offering the same deal to the other and
confidently waits for a confession.
Her confidence is based on the fact that she
thinks each will rank the payoffs as follows on a
scale between 1, the worst payoff, and 4, the best;
the figures need have only ordinal significance:
Confess when the other confesses: 2 (the pun-
ishment payoff, P)
Refuse when the other confesses: 1 (the sucker's
payoff, S)
Confess when the other refuses: 4 (the temptation
payoff, T)
Refuse when the other refuses: 3 (the reward
payoff, R)
If the D.A. is right about the prisoners' rankings
then a standard assumption of rationality suggests
that each will indeed confess. The strategy of con-
fessing is dominant. It is better when the other man
confesses, yielding 2 rather than 1; and it is better
when he refuses, giving 4 rather than 3.
The dilemma which the D.A. manufactures for
her prisoners is obvious once we construct a matrix,
showing the payoffs for each under every combina-
tion of strategies. One prisoner chooses between the
rows, the other between the columns. Row's payoffs
are shown first in each box, Column's second:
Refuse Confess
Refuse 3, 3 1,4
Confess 4, 1 2, 2
The dilemma consists in the choice between
refusing and confessing. Confess and you will end
up with 2, refuse and you will end up with 1. And
this despite the fact that if you could only both
refuse at once you would each get 3.
More formally explicated, two conditions char-
acterise the prisoner's dilemma. The first is that the
strategy of confessing is dominant for each. The
second is that the outcome of both parties following
that strategy is Pareto-inferior to the outcome of
each refusing to confess: it does worse for some —
in our case all — and is better for none.
Commentaries on the dilemma often emphasise
different features but these two capture all that is
important. Sometimes the fact that confess-confess
is an equilibrium receives more attention. But that
means just that it is an outcome from which no
party can unilaterally depart with advantage, a
feature ensured by the fact that confessing is domi-
nant for each. Sometimes too the essence of the
dilemma is said to be that T is preferred to R, and
R to P, and P to S. That is true, given the structure
of the payoffs, but not surprisingly: it ensures after
all that the two conditions mentioned are fulfilled.
In a standard taxonomy there is only one variety
of two-party game satisfying these conditions (see
Rapaport and Guyer). The importance of the pris-
oner's dilemma story is that it illustrates the sort
of co-operative predicament in question. It shows
that there are cases where the concern of two parties
to maximise their own payoffs can lead them each
to get a lower payoff than might otherwise have
been attained. It demonstrates that there are in-
stances where individualistically rational strategies
collectively yield sub-optimal results.
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If this sort of co-operative predicament occurs
commonly in social life, then the prisoner's dilem-
ma story points to an important lesson. It shows
that we cannot rely on the invisible hand to distil
collective good out of individual self-interest, to
convert private vice into public virtue. The in-
visible foot can do as much harm as the invisible
hand does good. The story suggests that there is
another hand at work where po-operatiye predica-
ments are solved and that, if there is not, there
ought to be. It has both explanatory and policy-
making implications.
In this paper I wish to consider a number of
questions bearing on the significance of the dilem-
ma story. I do not have an original thesis to defend
but under each heading I shall make some points
that are not recognised, or at least not commonly
recognised, in the literature.
My questions are:
1. Are the motivational assumptions of the pris-
oner's dilemma realistic?
2. Are the assumptions about the setting re-
alistic?
3. Does the dilemma generalise to the many-
party case?
4. Is the prisoner's dilemma model useful in
explanation?
5. Is it useful in policy-making?
1. Are the motivational assumptions realistic?
There are two motivational assumptions which the
District Attorney makes about the prisoners. The
first is that the payoffs reflect the concern of each
with just his own welfare. The second is that each
will try to maximise the payoff he receives. How
far can these be varied? And are they realistic, so
far as they cannot?
Contrary to what is almost universally suggested,
the first assumption can be dropped: the payoffs
may reflect on other-regarding rather than a self-
regarding disposition (contrast Hardin 1982, p. 10,
and Axelrod 1984, p.6-7). This appears in the fact
that the matrix fits a variant story as well as the
original.
Suppose that the prisoners are perfect altruists,
each concerned only with the other and not at all
with himself. Suppose further that the D.A. knows
this. She can still get them each to confess by giving
them the following line. Confess and the other chap
goes free if he refuses, while he gets a three-quarters
rap if he also confesses. Refuse and the other gets
a quarter rap if he refuses too, while he gets the
full term if he confesses.
Under this offer, the matrix for each remains as
it was before, the figures now reflecting an altruistic
disposition. Confessing will still be dominant since
it will benefit the other more, whether the other
confesses or refuses. Thus both will be altruistically
led to confess and only the D.A. will gain.
Given that the prisoners need not be self-regard-
ing, must they at least seek to maximise their
payoffs? Again, no: this assumption is as variable
as the other. Suppose that we have a game de-
scribed, with self-regarding payoffs, in the following
matrix:
Refuse Confess
Refuse 3,3 4,!
Confess 1,4 2,2
This matrix answers to the situation of our
altruistic prisoners in the story just told, but with
the crucial feature that the payoffs represent their
respective interests, not their altruistic dispositions.
Consider now what happens if the prisoners are
assumed to maximise, not their own payoffs, but
those of their partner. Each clearly will be driven
to confess, since confessing in such a case will be
better for his partner, regardless of what the partner
does. Equally clearly, however, it will lead the two
into an outcome which they must rank below the
outcome of refuse-refuse.
I have shown that the twin assumptions of self-
regarding payoffs and maximising strategy can be
independently relaxed. Obviously they can also be
relaxed together. We can easily imagine a story for
which the game characterisation is the matrix just
given but with the payoffs reflecting a disposition
that is not self-regarding. In such a case the policy
of maximising the payoff to the other will still
produce the Pareto-inferior outcome.1
What these considerations show is that the co-
operative predicament illustrated in the prisoner's
dilemma does not arise just for self-interested
agents. The payoffs which agents maximise need
not be self-regarding and they need not even be
their own. But what if the agents are not max-
imisers? Does that tell against the possibility of the
co-operative predicament in question?
If the payoffs to each agent reflect his preferences
all things considered — things regarding others
perhaps as well as himself— then it scarcely makes
sense to think that he does not maximise them (see
Pettit, 1984a, pp. 172-173). But in the story about
the altruists we assumed that payoffs need not be
of this encompassing character. Might the predica-
ment arise then for agents who satisfice on the
achievement of such payoffs, or take some other
non-maximising line?
There is no reason why it should not. Given
appropriate stories and matrices, even policies like
minimising the payoff to oneself or to the other,
or just realising one less than the best, will lead the
agents into the Pareto-inferior outcome. There is
no prophylactic available here against the dangers
of the co-operative predicament.
There remains one motivational assumption in
the prisoner's dilemma which we have not yet
questioned. Whether payoffs are self-regarding or
not, whether agents are concerned with their own
payoffs or those of others, whether the concern is
to maximise or to effect a different result, we have
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The Prisoner's Dilemma and Social Theory: An Overview of Some Issues
assumed so far that each agent is focussed on
distinct goals. The parties may not be self-interested
but they are interested in divergent goods. This
even holds of the altruists, each of whom cares only
for the other.
We have here the core motivational assumption
in the two-person prisoner's dilemma (see Parfit
1984, Chapter 4; also Moore 1984). That is clear
from the fact that once it is relaxed, the predica-
ment is resolved. Consider what happens if just one
prisoner is an altruist, so that both maximise the
other's payoffs; or if both compare respective
payoffs in some way and maximise the average
return; or if they are subject to any twist of motiva-
tion which gives them a common goal. The predica-
ment in many such cases disappears. The pair
achieve the outcome that best answers to their
desires.
We can see this if we go back to the original
matrix, viz.
Refuse Confess
Refuse 3,3 1,4
Confess 4,1 2,2
If Row is a perfect altruist and Column a perfect
egoist then both will seek the refuse-confess out-
come. If they maximise average returns — assum-
ing the figures have cardinal significance — then
they will each go for refuse-refuse. And so on.
This line of reflection suggests that the motiva-
tional assumptions of the prisoner's dilemma are
quite realistic. Self-interested egoists may be just
images of the economics textbook but agents with
divergent interests are a common or garden sort.
We each look after not just ourselves, but our
families, our friends and our countries, our hobbies,
our jobs and our causes. Furthermore, as stock-
holders we appoint boards to further the company's
interests; as workers we subscribe to the union to
promote the workforce's welfare; as citizens we
elect governments to see to the country's good. We
are divergently motivated ourselves and we coun-
tenance and encourage such motivation in the
institutional agents that we license.
It is no surprise therefore to find that two-party
dilemmas, or at least potential dilemmas, are the
stuff of everyday life: neighbours face them over
fencing, draining and noise; friends over restau-
rants and films and other friends; companies over
prices and markets; governments over pollution
and armaments; and so on in a familiar pattern.
The world is rife with co-operative predicaments.
2. Are the assumptions about the setting re-
alistic?
Just as the prisoner's dilemma is often thought to
be atypical because it requires self-interested agents,
so it is sometimes cast as marginal on the grounds
that the participants are cut off from communica-
tion with each other. This response is likely to be
reinforced by the fact that allowing subjects in
prisoner's dilemma experiments to communicate,
even about irrelevant matters, makes it more likely
that they will achieve the co-operative outcome (see
Rapaport 1974).
I do not believe that the absence of communica-
tion is a significant assumption in the prisoner's
dilemma. The point has often been made that, so
long as the payoffs remain as they are, communica-
tion will not help the prisoners get to the refuse-
refuse outcome. The only way in which it might
help is by causing the payoffs to shift so that there
no longer is a predicament Having promised to
refuse to confess each might find the reward payoff
R more attractive than the temptation T; this,
because it matters to him that he keeps his prom-
ises. That effect aside however, communication
would not help to resolve the predicament. Each
might promise to refuse but if he pays attention to
the payoffs, he is bound to break his word.
This point holds even for our perfectly altruistic
prisoners. Provided neither puts a premium on
keeping his word, each will break any promise to
refuse and try to further the interests of the other
by confessing.
The possible effect that I put aside in the above
discussion points us towards a deeper assumption
about setting than the absence of communication
itself. This is that the payoffs given in the matrix
for the dilemma pick up everything that matters
to each in his choice. He must not care about
breaking or being seen to break a promise, about
behaving or being seen to behave in a unilateral
fashion, about signalling an individualistic concep-
tion of the relationship with his partner, or what-
ever. The payoffs that he considers, whether his
own or those of the other, must be the only factors
relevant to his choice.
This assumption is not very plausible. It would
be likely to hold only under two conditions: first,
that the parties do not mind having a reputation
for rugged individualism or unilateralism; and sec-
ondly, that they do not meet in indefinitely ex-
tended sequences of dilemmas and other interac-
tions.
The first condition is necessary because if the
parties are concerned about having individualistic
reputations, they will often be led to ignore the
immediate payoffs in favour of their long-term
standing. The condition is not fulfilled in the or-
dinary run of interpersonal exchanges but there are
circumstances where it may be satisfied. These are
settings in which an individualistic ethos is cul-
tivated: among competing businessmen, among
diplomacy and monopoly players, among the legal
representatives of opposing clients, and the like.
The second condition is necessary because even
individualistic parties will be concerned with more
than the payoffs of a particular dilemma if similar
dilemmas, or any interactions with reciprocal bene-
fits, are likely to engage those parties in the future.
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The iteration of two-party prisoner's dilemmas into
an indefinite future undermines the assumption
about setting involved in characterising each as
properly a dilemma.2 It means that each is only a
potential dilemma, not an actual one.
The reason is intuitive. If two parties are going
to be caught in a series of co-operative predica-
ments, then the strategy which will best serve each
is to co-operate so long as the other does so. The
strategy makes no sense in a one-off dilemma, since
the agents make their choices independently. It is
possible in an iteration of predicaments, because
the other's choice in the previous interaction can
be made the basis of one's own choice in the present
one. The two parties can signal a willingness to co-
operate and can punish one another for any failure
to come into line. Each may co-operate for example
except where the other has defected on the previous
play: this is the so-called tit-for-tat strategy.
In the one-shot dilemma, only categorical
strategies are available: co-operate or defect.3 Once
we have indefinite iteration, we are into a different
game. Each is now in a position to choose a strategy
for the sequence in prospect — the supergame, as
it has been called — and the strategies on offer
include conditional ones like tit-for-tat: I co-operate
in the first play and afterwards I co-operate if the
other has just co-operated and defect if he has just
defected. In such a supergame there are equilibria
with conditional strategies and these include ones
that are Pareto-superior to the equilibrium con-
stituted by each permanently defecting (see Taylor
1976, pp. 31-43). Thus we may expect rational
participants to reach some such equilibrium. Prob-
ably the most salient occurs when each party uses
tit-for-tat (see Axelrod 1984 and Goodin 1984).
It is extremely uncommon to find this second
condition fulfilled for real-life two-party dilemmas
(see Parfit 1984, Chapter 2). Most of us, and most
of the institutional agents which we create, are
involved in potentially long-term relationships
with any other parties that we encounter in a co-
operative predicament. Even if we have no worries
about gaining an individualistic reputation, we will
find ourselves concerned with more than the
payoffs that characterise the dilemma. True dilem-
mas as distinct from potential ones probably only
arise then in very exceptional circumstances.
3. Does the prisoner's dilemma generalise to the
many-party case?
In the second section I took away with one hand
what I conceded in the first section with the other.
Having argued earlier that the core motivational
. assumption in the two-party prisoner's dilemma is
realistic, I went on to show that its main assump-
tion about setting is not. But we should not lose
interest too quickly for, as we shall see in this
section, the assumption about setting regains
credibility in the many-party version of the dilem-
ma. More than that indeed, it turns out that under
the more general version the core motivational
assumption may also be capable of being relaxed.
Given large numbers, the invisible foot strikes back
with a vengeance.
The definition of the two-party dilemma men-
tions two conditions: that the defect (ie. confess)
strategy is dominant for both participants and that
the outcome of defect-defect is Pareto-inferior to
the outcome of co-operate-co-operate (ie. refuse-
refuse). The straightforward generalisation for N
persons, where N can be greater than 2, will require
in parallel: that the defect strategy is dominant for
each but that the outcome of universal defection
is Pareto-inferior to that of universal co-operation
(see Taylor 1976, Chapter 3 and Sen 1969).
The prisoner's dilemma comes into its own with
large numbers because, given this definition, it is
clear that free rider problems are all examples of
it. The free rider problem is a familiar sort of
predicament. It arises when there is a certain sort
of good which a group can obtain for itself and from
which no individual can be excluded; when the way
to achieve the good is for members to take on a
certain burden — of effort or restraint or finance;
and when the good can be realised at a level
sufficient to compensate contributors short of the
point when all contribute. The problem is how to
prevent people from letting others carry the burden,
in the hope that they will enjoy the good never-
theless. Their own contribution might increase the
level of the good available but it is assumed that
it would not do by a sufficient margin to com-
pensate them personally for the burden involved.
Examples of the predicament abound. Consider
the situation of a team in tug-o-war, of a communi-
ty which wishes to keep the local park free of litter;
or of a group of television users who want to invest
in equipment to boost certain signals in their area.
In each case, the free rider threatens to strike. He
will seek to enjoy the fruit of the labours of others,
evading the burden of effort or restraint or finance
which they have to bear.
The free rider problem is a prisoner's dilemma .
because for practical purposes it meets both of the
conditions mentioned. Universal free-riding is
Pareto-inferior to universal co-operation, since the
cost to each in the latter event is outweighed by
the benefit collectively enjoyed. Free riding how-
ever is a dominant strategy for every party. Each
will reason, first, that if sufficient others contribute,
then the extra benefit gained by his contributing
will be less than the cost of doing so; and secondly,
that if not enough others contribute, then the cost
of his doing so will be in vain, since his contribution
is unlikely to make the difference between pro-
vision and non-provision of the collective good. In
either case free riding is the preferable strategy: it
dominates co-operation.
I say that the free rider problem meets our two
conditions for practical purposes. The reason for
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The Prisoner's Dilemma and Social Theory: An Overview of Some Issues
the qualification is that there is one case where free
riding would not dominate co-operation. This oc-
curs if the individual knows that he is the crucial
contributor he is the one who will make the
difference between there being a sufficient and an
insufficient number of contributors.
For practical purposes each can ignore this possi-
bility in most free rider problems. It will be too
unlikely to deserve consideration. Or it may be that
the good to be achieved is vaguely defined and that
the contribution of no individual can be held to
make the difference between its realisation and its
non-realisation. Grains of sand make a heap but
no grain marks the divide between a heap and a
non-heap. Similarly, as Richard Tuck has observed,
individual contributions can make for a collective
good without any one contribution being crucial for
the achievement of the good (see Tuck 1979 and
Fishkin 1982). This happens with goods such as
having a reasonably clean park, having an adequate
television signal, having a good community ethos,
and the like.
For all that has been said, free rider problems
may be potential prisoner's dilemmas rather than
actual ones. The crucial questions are whether they
fulfil the assumptions about motivation and setting
mentioned in previous sections.
The motivational assumption is that each party
has a distinct aim. That is satisfied in most free
rider predicaments because, while each desires the
collective good at issue, each wants it at least cost
to himself. Each is in pursuit therefore of a different
goal.
In passing, it is worth noting that by most
accounts free rider problems can arise even for
convergently orientated agents such as utilitarians.
Suppose that N persons seek to maximise overall
utility and are confronted with the task of providing
a collective non-excludable good. They may each
still free ride, on the grounds that since the marginal
benefit of his contributing is less than the cost, the
way to achieve maximal utility overall is for him
to leave the creation of the good to others.
Some writers contend that such utilitarians are
simply making a mistake in calculation; we shall
discuss this view in the final section. The alter-
native story is that they are victims of their limited
perspective. Each seeks to maximise overall utility
but each sees that goal from a different point of
view. He has to decide what intervention he will
make, given that it is independently settled whether
enough others will make their contributions or not.
If this story is accepted, then we see that the
motivational assumption of divergent interests can
be slightly relaxed without undermining certain
many-party prisoner's dilemmas.
Do free rider problems satisfy the assumption
about setting as well? It appears that they often do.
Free riders may gain individualistic reputations —
if they are noticed — but we know that in some
settings at any rate that won't matter. More im-
portantly, they will not be concerned, at least in the
case of large groups, with punishment in future
dilemmas for past defections. One reason is relative
anonymity and the fact that there will not be a
single recurrent partner to mete out retribution;
another we will come to later. Thus it seems likely
that in many free rider predicaments the parties will
be attentive just to the payoffs that characterise it
as a prisoner's dilemma. We will have a genuine
dilemma on our hands, not merely a potential one.
Given free rider problems, it is clear that pris-
oners dilemmas generalise to the many-person case
and indeed come into their own there. In conclud-
ing this section I would like to turn to a topic not
much discussed in the literature. This is the source
of the dilemma in the free rider case: the reason
why the payoffs there assume the pattern character-
istic of the dilemma.
Suppose that all the members of a group are
required to provide a non-excludable good. It is
clear in that case that no-one will be tempted to
free ride. Everyone will be deprived of his share of
the good if he defects and we assume that this
benefit outweighs the cost of contributing. A similar
point holds in the case where a subgroup of K
members is capable of providing the collective
good, if only at some minimal threshold (see Olson
1965 and Schelling 1978). If anyone knows that K-l
other parties, and only K-l, have contributed or
will contribute, then he is no longer tempted to free
ride. This shows that the reason why the free rider
problem exists, the reason why the payoffs there
assume the profile of a dilemma, is that everyone
must deem it extremely unlikely that he will be the
decisive contributor.
We can now set up a contrast — never, surpris-
ingly, made in the literature — between free rider
problems and another species of prisoner's dilem-
ma: these I will call foul dealer problems. The free
rider defects only because he does not think he will
be decisive for the minimal achievement of the
good in question. The foul dealer may also not
believe that he will be decisive but that is not his
reason for defecting. He will have reason to defect
— defecting will remain dominant for him — even
if he knows that N-l, let alone K-l, have already
co-operated.
Both free rider and foul dealer problems display
the structure of costs and benefits which makes
them prisoner's dilemmas: both meet the two con-
ditions mentioned. The difference comes in the
source of those costs and benefits. The free rider
balances the marginal benefit of his contribution
to a collective good against the absolute cost of that
contribution, psychological, physical or financial.
The foul dealer — at least when he knows he is
decisive — balances his share in the benefit pro-
cured by co-operation against the comparative cost
of a lost opportunity: the opportunity to take ad-
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vantage of the co-operation of others, scoring at
their expense.
Another way of making this contrast is to con-
sider the attitude which N-l contributing members
ought to take to a defector. In a free rider problem,
where N-l is greater than K, they may feel resent-
ment at the defector's costlessly enjoying the fruit
of their labour. They are marginally worse off after
all than if he joined in. However it will generally
make no sense for them to think of retaliating by
massive defection; this matter will come up again
in the final section. That is because the defector
does not make them worse off than they would have
been if they had not co-operated and had not
thereby exposed themselves to free riding. He may
put them below the universal co-operation baseline
but he does not force them beneath the baseline of
universal non-co-operation.
In a foul dealer problem things are quite dif-
ferent. The N-l contributors are not just free ridden
in a costless enjoyment of their labour. They have
their efforts nullified and their work undermined.
The foul dealer reduces them to a level below the
baseline of universal defection. Thus it will be
rational for them, not just to feel resentment, but
to defect themselves in retaliation.
There is a weakened and more general version
of the foul dealer problem that should also be
mentioned. In this predicament, the lone defector
reduces some party or parties, but not all, below
the baseline of universal defection. Here it will be
rational for co-operators to threaten to defect in
response to any single defection if they are of a
maximin mentality, wishing at all costs to avoid
the worst possibility.
Foul dealer problems are clearly a purer form of
prisoner's dilemma than free rider ones. Two-party
dilemmas are all of the foul dealer sort, since the
lone defector does not share in the benefit of the
other's co-operative effort but takes damaging ad-
vantage of him. Many party dilemmas too can fit
the bill. One example might be the predicament of
a community of armed and violent people. All are
better off if each destroys his weapons at a pre-
arranged time. But the knowledge that he will make
the difference between co-operation by N and N-l
or by some threshold K and K-l does not give
anyone a reason not to defect. On the contrary, it
promises maximal benefit.
Foul dealer problems are unlikely to be more
than potential predicaments. This is because every
defector will attract retaliation in further exchanges,
at least if the problem is of the non-weakened sort.
One-shot dilemmas therefore will give way to a
supergame in which equilibria other than universal
defection will be available and Pareto-superior.
Foul dealer problems, like two-party dilemmas
generally, will be short of an appropriate setting.
Finally, a note in redemption of a promise. I said
earlier that there was a further reason besides
anonymity why parties in a free rider problem need
not be concerned with factors other than the charac-
teristic payoffs. The reason should now be obvious.
Resentment may be a rational response towards a
free rider but retaliation will not be. Thus the free
rider, unlike the foul dealer, does not have reason
to fear the punishment of massive defection in
further instances of the predicament. He can defect
without much fear of the consequences.
4. Is the prisoner's dilemma model useful in
explanation?
Suppose I am asked to explain why there are trees
planted on one of the university lawns. I will not
know what sort of explanation is sought, let alone
provide it, unless two further matters are clear to
me. First, I must be aware of the contrasting
possibility or possibilities envisaged in the ques-
tion. Am I asked to explain why there are trees
rather than flowers; why there are trees rather than
nothing; why there are trees planted rather than
trees freestanding in boxes; why there are trees
planted on that lawn rather than some other, and
so on?
Secondly, I have to see what the background
suppositions are in the light of which the actual
situation is to be explained. Is the question asked
within everyday psychology, on the assumption
that gardeners plant trees and the like for aesthetic
effect? Or is the answer to that taken as given, and
the question posed within Freudian psychology, on
the assumption that aesthetic tastes spring from
deeper sources?
These observations on contrasting possibility
and background supposition are relevant, not just
in the case of our trivial example, but for any form
of explanation (see van Frassen 1980, Chapter 5).
What they show is that the object which an explana-
tion is meant to make intelligible is not the simple
state of affairs expressed by the sentence 'q' which
occurs in the explanation 'That p explains why q\
That object, the explanandum, is something ex-
pressed by the more complex sentence: 'q rather
than r, given s\ where r is the relevant contrast (s)
and s the relevant supposition (s).
Returning now to the prisoner's dilemma model,
we are in a position to notice its explanatory benefit
straightaway. This is that the model generates fruit-
ful explananda for social theory. It does so by
highlighting social predicaments which are at least
potential dilemmas and by providing them with a
background of appropriate contrasts and supposi-
tions.
The highlighting of predicaments occurs when,
with the model in mind, we begin to discover, as
M. Jourdain discovered that he had been speaking
prose, that we have been dealing with prisoner's
dilemmas all our lives. Am I to contribute to the
emergency fund for Ethiopia? Am I to make a
correct tax return? Am I to put the anti-pollution
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device on my car? Is my union to do its bit for
advancing the cause of the unemployed? Is my city
or state to play its part in maintaining national
highways? Is my country to pay the cost of uphold-
ing a boycott against South Africa? Social life begins
to bristle with potential co-operative predicaments,
once we look at it from the viewpoint of the
prisoner's dilemma.
Suppose that a predicament is one that is re-
solved by or for the parties involved. In that case
the model will cause us to look for the factor or
factors that make a difference between it and the
obvious contrasts: analogous predicaments in
which the participants fail to co-operate. Suppose
on the other hand that it is not resolved. In that
event the contrasts selected will be counterpart
situations in which co-operation is achieved and we
will be invited to search for the factors that are
lacking in the predicament on hand.
What the model does in both of these cases is
to give us good questions to ask. The questions are
good on a number of grounds. They do not make
'unrealistic' motivational assumptions which
would deprive the answers of a connection with the
real world. They allow answers which are com-
parable across very different instances and which
may accumulate in a body of general knowledge.
And the answers which they invite engage with our
interests as social participants: they show us what
we are doing right when we succeed in co-operating
and what we are doing wrong in other cases. In
short, the questions generated by the model make
possible a social theory that is at once relevant,
general and practical.
But does the prisoner's dilemma model suggest
background suppositions as well as contrasts for the
social explanatory enterprise? I believe that it does,
though this point is not so manifest. The suggestion
which I find in the model is that where co-operation
is achieved, that is to be psychologically explained
by reference to the effects of iteration or other
external forces on the opportunities or payoffs or
dispositions of the agent. In other words, the back-
ground supposition is that people, and the institu-
tional agents which people create, behave in a
rationally interpretable manner: they act in-
telligibly, in the light of independently intelligible
attitudes (see Macdonald and Pettit 1981, Chapter
2). That this is the supposition suggested may not
be so obvious however, given that there is an
alternative candidate in the offing.
The alternative proposal is that society conforms
to the picture projected in the writings of some
functionalists, being such that the prerequisites of
survival, stability, cohesion or whatever are more
or less deterministically fulfilled. The prisoner's
dilemma model might just be taken to suggest that
there is a function-satisfying mechanism at work,
the role of the model being to highlight putative
functions in need of fulfilment. Where the predica-
ments highlighted are resolved, the functionalist
story would run smoothly. Where they are not, we
would be invited to see why their resolution is not
after all important or to identify some block to
social functioning, some spanner in the works of
society (see Stinchcombe 1980).
The functionalist supposition of a self-adjusting
society is highly dubious, since it is not clear why
or how society should come to adjust in this way
(see Macdonald and Pettit 1981, Chapter 3). In any
case, however, I think that it is foreign to the way
of thinking associated with the prisoner's dilemma
model. In that model we are invited to consider the
psychological payoffs in virtue of which certain co-
operative predicaments obtain. Those payoffs
make for a predicament only so far as the parties
are expected to act in the light of their payoffs. But
to be expected to act in that way is to be supposed
to be rationally interpretable. Thus the background
supposition is as I described it earlier.
In summary then, the explanatory use of the
prisoner's dilemma model is that it gives us good
questions to ask in pursuit of rational as distinct
from functional social theory. But before leaving
the topic there are three further comments I would
like to make.
The first is that the dilemma is just one, albeit
probably the most important one, of a number of
social predicaments. Others are represented in
games like the assurance game or the game of
chicken, as they are known in the literature (see
Taylor and Ward 1982). These are likely to serve
similar explanatory roles to that which we have
assigned to the dilemma. Using the dilemma as a
model does not mean disavowing the use of such
other games. The point scarcely needs emphasis.
The second comment I would like to make is that
when we explain a social response or institution as
a solution to a prisoner's dilemma, or indeed to any
social predicament, we are required to show how
it could have emerged among rationally in-
terpretable agents. Otherwise our explanation is no
more helpful than the functionalist's observation
that the phenomenon is functional. It is not surpris-
ing that as-if aetiologies have an important place
in the sort of social theory associated with the
dilemma model. Such a priori and counterfactual
derivations are our only guarantee that it is sensible
to claim that the response or institution occurs
because it solves the predicament.
My final comment is of a more general character.
It is that the use of the prisoner's dilemma model
is part of a broader explanatory enterprise and that
the invisible hand, even in the sense in which it
may work like an invisible foot, is only one mecha-
nism which may be invoked there. The enterprise
begins with presumptively rational human beings
and calls upon a variety of mechanisms to explain
how the unseeing or half-seeing initiatives of such
agents give rise to aggregate and organisational
phenomena: phenomena which, from the view-
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point of the agents' interests, may be benign or
malign or mixed.
The mechanisms which such theory calls upon
are usefully characterised in the image of guiding
hands. The hand which guides may combine the
efforts of individuals, or select from among their
products, or simply pre-empt what they do. Each
hand may operate in a hidden or overt manner.
Thus the combinative hand may be the invisible
hand with which we are familiar or the helping hand
of public co-operation. The selectional hand may
be the dealing, and perhaps double-dealing, hand
of the covert manipulator, or the even hand of the
open poll or contest. Finally, the pre-emptive hand
may be the hidden hand of backstage control or the
heavy hand of dictatorship (see Pettit 1984b).
The prisoner's dilemma model commits a theo-
rist to the belief that it is mechanisms such as these
which move the social world, meshing individual
behaviour into institutional outcome. It is not the
iron hand of history or sociology which does that
work, or at least not in a manner that undercuts
rational agency.4
5. Is the prisoner's dilemma model useful in
policy-making?
Because it captures the structure of a recurring
sort of social predicament, there can be no doubt
but that the prisoner's dilemma model is bound to
be of use to policy-makers. I do not mean just to
policy-makers in the narrow public service sense.
I mean to all of us, when we consider how society
is best organised under its civil, economic and
political aspects (see Pettit 1980, Chapters 1-3).
The model serves as a discipline for the imagina-
tion when we examine the question of how co-
operative predicaments are best resolved. It enables
us to distinguish the various sorts of resolutions
possible and to debate their merits in neglect of
distracting detail.
The resolutions can be roughly classified as
strategic, psychological and political. The strategic
gets parties over a potential co-operative predica-
ment by embedding it in a sequence of predica-
ments and generating a supergame in which it is
rational to co-operate. The psychological relieves
them of their problem by inducing attitudes or
principles of such a character, usually of such a
moral character, that co-operation becomes de-
sirable: the troublesome payoffs are reformed or
made irrelevant. Finally, the political resolution
introduces such restraints or threats or promises as
alter the opportunities or payoffs of the participants
and, once again, rationalise die co-operative option.
In the assessment of these various sorts of resolu-
tion, it is plausible to rank them according to degree
of interference with the participants involved. On
such a ranking, strategic solutions would be best,-
psychological second best, and political worst This
is not the place to debate such an ordering principle
or to consider other grounds of assessment. What
I would like to do instead is to take the principle
as given and mention some problems that stand in
the way of three non-political solutions which have
recently been touted.
The most radical of these is a resolution — or
perhaps a dissolution — which Richard Tuck has
proposed for the free rider problem, or at least for
certain instances of that problem (see Tuck 1979).
Tuck's line is that not even strategic factors are
necessary to resolve this predicament; it withers
under clear scrutiny, and indeed under the scrutiny
of regular participants.
Tuck argues that the potential free rider finds
himself in the same sort of predicament as the
potential procrastinator and that just as pro-
crastination is a problem which our ordinary com-
mon sense gets us over, so we can rely on everyday
wisdom to get us over the free riding difficulty. In
each case, as Tuck constructs them , our task is the
achievement of a vague outcome such that each
individual contribution is incapable of making the
difference between its realisation and its non-re-
alisation. The procrastinator is a shepherd, in
Tuck's example, who wants to build a cairn by
adding a stone a day. The free rider is a member
of a group which wishes to obtain a parallel, vaguely
defined goal by having each individual perform the
counterpart of adding a stone.
We may grant that at least certain sorts of free
rider problems are of this character. The question
is whether we should go along with Tuck's con-
clusion that just as the shepherd's problem — no
single stone makes the difference between a caim
and a non-cairn — is solved ambulando, so we may
expect the free rider difficulty to be overcome; that
just as people have enough sense not to pro-
crastinate, so they ought to be sufficiently in-
telligent not to free ride.
Unfortunately, I do not think that we can indulge
ourselves in such optimism. There is an important
asymmetry between procrastination and free riding
which Tuck's parallel covers up. The reason it is
not sensible of me to put off adding today's stone
may be that such an omission is likely to set up
a disposition in me to postpone every addition and
that would be fatal for the cairn. Such a reason does
not obtain in the free riding predicament. My free
riding is not likely to cause others also to free ride
and so the consideration that militates against
procrastination does not carry any force here.
A less radical proposal than Tuck's has been
suggested recently by Russell Hardin (see Hardin
1982, pp.28-29). He is primarily concerned also
with the free rider problem. The argument is that
there are potential resolutions of some many-party
dilemmas which strategic considerations should
cause to emerge; and that such a resolution must
be available for the free rider problem, since it is
an instance of. a prisoner's dilemma.
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The Prisoner's Dilemma and Social Theory: An Overview of Some Issues
Hardin's premise is true and interesting. He
shows that in the many-party dilemma there are
conditional strategies which are not just Pareto-
optimal equilibria, but Pareto-optimal co-ordina-
tion equilibria. The equilibrium is an outcome such
that no one can do better through his own unilateral
departure from it. The co-ordination equilibrium
is more demanding: here no one can do better
through any unilateral departure, his own or some-
one else's. The availability of such an equilibrium
does suggest that the predicament may be
strategically resoluble. Let a group get to such an
outcome — Hardin describes some possible routes
— and all will prefer that each conform, thereby
having a motive to keep everyone in line by what-
ever sanctions are available.
I do not believe however that Hardin's con-
clusion follows. The reason is that some prisoner's
dilemmas are foul dealer problems, others free rider
predicaments, and resolutions of the one sort may
not be available for the other. More particularly,
I believe that the co-ordination equilibrium solu-
tion is appropriate for foul dealer cases but not for
the free rider problems to which Hardin applies it.
The Pareto-optimal co-ordination equilibria
which Hardin hails involve conditional strategies
such as tit-for-tat: I co-operate unless someone has
just defected. If everyone followed such a strategy
in a prisoner's dilemma, we would certainly have
a co-ordination equilibrium. By switching, each
would invite punishment and do worse than he
does with tit-for-tat. By anyone else's switching, he
would be required to mete out punishment, i.e.
defect next time around, and he would also do
worse himself.
The problem with the co-ordination equilibrium
envisaged however is that the conditional strategies
involved are not generally credible in a free rider
predicament, only in a foul dealer one. The foul
dealer's defection puts all others beneath the
baseline of universal defection and so he must
believe them when they threaten to defect for his
every defection. The free rider's defection does not
do this and he would find the corresponding threat
quite hollow. No group of parties in a free rider
problem could persuasively aspire to converge on
an equilibrium of conditional strategies.
The weakest predicament in which such
strategies would be generally credible is the weak-
ened foul dealer problem. This arises when the
defector is bound to plunge somebody, though not
necessarily everybody, below the baseline of uni-
versal defection. Here it would be credible of every-
one to threaten defection for a defection by another,
if it is credible that everyone maximins, protecting
himself against the worst eventuality: viz. being the
person reduced to misery. That could just be be-
lieved, at least under certain sorts of payoffs.
Despite suggesting the argument mentioned,
Hardin does at one point concede that the credibili-
ty problem generally blocks the strategic resolution
of free rider predicaments; it allows it only under
very special circumstances (see Hardin 1982,
p. 194). Those circumstances occur when parties are
able to pre-commit themselves to a strategy like tit-
for-tat. Given a small group where everyone knows
everyone else for example, the parties could pre-
commit themselves by staking a bet, or just their
honour, on retaliation when tit-for-tat requires re-
taliation. Such circumstances are not typical, un-
fortunately, of free rider situations.
Where Tuck believes that to free ride is a failure
like procrastination, and Hardin thinks that it is
often a strategic error, Derek Parfit argues a less
radical but still surprising thesis. This is that free
riding is a moral mistake, at least for someone who
is impartially benevolent: someone who has an
equal concern for all, including himself (see Parfit
1984, Chapter 3).
Parfit makes a number of points, the brunt of
which is that many apparent examples of free rider
problems that arise for utilitarians are indeed just
apparent. But when he considers the really trouble-
some cases, he has to call on extremely con-
troversial intuitions. These cases can be ex-
emplified in a trivial instance: all the members of
a community are interested in maintaining the
cricket oval in good repair and can do so only if
enough of them do not walk across it for a short-
cut. The problem is, why should a utilitarian who
is in a position to save himself considerable trouble
.by taking the short-cut, not do so when he gets the
chance. His deviation will not make any perceptible
difference to people's enjoyment of the ground and
we may assume that it will not be noticed by others
and will not cause widespread defection.
Such a utilitarian weighs, on the one hand, the
trouble of not taking the short-cut and, on the other,
the imperceptible harm of doing so. One way in
which he might be persuaded not to go the shorter
route is by being brought to realise that the harm
is real, though imperceptible, and is liable to out-
weigh his own convenience, being suffered by
many. The other is by being led to think that he
ought to consider, not just the effect of his own
compliance or defection, but the joint effect of all
those complying or defecting: this will constitute a
perceptible benefit or harm.
Parfit urges the attraction of both lines of thought
but not, to my mind, persuasively. His argument
for the first is that if an imperceptible harm is not
a real harm then nothing is (Parfit 1984, p.78-79).
The imperceptible harm will be at least as bad as
a harm that differs from it by an imperceptible
increase; as bad as a harm that differs from that
harm in turn by such an increase; and eventually
as bad as the very substantial harm to which such
increases can lead. Thus if it is not a real harm,
neither will that substantial injury be one. This
argument turns however on the assumption that 'at
least as bad as' is a transitive relation, so that if
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X is at least as bad as Y, and Y as Z, then X is
at least as bad as Z. In the sort of case on hand
that assumption is false. An injury X can feel at
least as bad as Y, and Y as Z, but X not feel as
bad as Z.
Parfit's argument for the second line — that the
utilitarian ought to consider more than the effects
of his own action — is less explicit than that for
the first But it is no more compelling. It does not
offer independent grounds for the conclusion, com-
ing ultimately to the claim that unless utilitarians
consider the joint effects of all actions like their
own, they will fall prey to prisoner's dilemmas. This
appears in the remark with which he concludes his
discussion. 'We must accept this view if our con-
cern for others is to yield solutions to most of the
many prisoner's dilemmas that we face' (Parfit
1984, p.86).
It may yet seem that Parfit has reason on his side.
If so, let me make some points in clarification of
where I stand. I do not deny that the right thing
for the utilitarian to praise is compliance, even if
free riding is the right thing to do. I do not even
deny that the right thing for utilitarians to do as
a group is to try to ensure that they each comply.
All I say is that if the utilitarian is in the enterprise
of unilaterally promoting maximum happiness,
then the only thing for him to do in cases like that
described will be to take the free ride.
Free rider problems are more resistant to resolu-
tion than any of our three authors suggest. That is
an important lesson for policy-making. My own
view is that many of our co-operative predicaments
require a political initiative and in conclusion I
would like just to mention a final consideration
which supports this.
In the dilemmas envisaged so far there are always
just two strategies available, co-operate or defect.
But many of the social predicaments which re-
semble the prisoner's dilemma are more com-
plicated: each party may defect, or may choose to
co-operate in pursuit of" solution 1, or in pursuit
of solution 2, or in pursuit of any of a number of
incompatible solutions. Co-operation is not a single
option; it is many. If not recognising private proper-
ty is a defect strategy in the state of nature, for
example, then there are as many strategies of co-
operation as there are possible systems of owner-
ship.
This complexity in co-operative predicaments
probably means that the state will often be neces-
sary to select and then reinforce one of the available
resolutions. However much we relish the invisible
hand, we may still require the strong arm. That
lesson is as old as Hobbes, but there is no reason
here for surprise. So, after all, is an appreciation
of the prisoner's dilemma (see Taylor 1976,
Chapter 6).5
NOTES
1. Notice that there is a regress in the offing. Two altruists
begin with certain payoffs. Learning about the other
each neglects his original payoffs for payoffs that
reflect his (now exclusive) concern with the other. But
before acting he checks again, only to find that the
other's payoffs have shifted in the way his own did.
So on to another round, and a regress (see Schick
1971).
2. Notice the qualification about an indefinite future. If
you and I set out to engage in what we know will only
be n dilemmas, then we each know that the rational
thing to do in the nth game is to defect, since there
is no punishment in prospect But in that case there
is no punishment in prospect either for defection in
game n-1. And so back by mathematical induction to
game 1.
3. Here and later the only strategies envisaged, categorical
or conditional, are pure. Mixed strategies, involving
gambles over pure ones, are not considered.
4. Functional explanation does not have to undercut
rational agency; perhaps only the functionalist credo
does that Marx offers examples of non-undercutting
functional accounts on the analysis of his theory in
Cohen 1978.
5. I am very grateful to Ra Foxton and Christie Slade for
research assistance and to Eveline Bancroft for typing
the manuscript I benefited greatly from discussion at
a series of seminars on the prisoner's dilemma in
which the paper was originally presented; the seminars
were held in 1984 in the Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University.
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